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Abstract: Numerous studies on the determinants of foreign direct investment fl ows 
in Latin America underscore the importance of risk- and cost-mitigating institu-
tions that support good governance, political and economic freedom, and demon-
strate a credible commitment to economic reform by regional governments. This 
study tests these variables against market size, macroeconomic policy, and factor 
controls to assess which combinations of variables explain the distribution of for-
eign infl ows. Using a time-series cross-sectional data set of fi fteen Latin American 
economies from 1985 to 2003, the study concludes that past performance on the 
current account provides suffi cient commitment by regional governments and that 
regime, good governance, and reform variables are, by comparison, inconsistent 
predictors of foreign direct investment.
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has played a critical role in the modern-
ization of Latin American economies, yet the factors explaining why global 
fi rms enter the region remain the subject of debate.1 There is little doubt 
that during the most recent period of economic reform, which has been 
dominated by market-oriented policies, FDI has gained a preeminent role 
as a provider of foreign capital, technology, and employment (Cuadros, 
Orts, and Alguacil 2004). There is not a single Latin American country, 
including Cuba, that is not actively wooing foreign fi rms to open new 
subsidiaries or to expand existing operations in their economies. Schol-
ars, however, differ on the determinants of FDI infl ows. Some credit the 
renewed emphasis on deregulation and liberalization of markets. Others 
claim that cost-sensitive fi rms shift their operations to expand their mar-
gins in highly competitive global markets and that Latin America has rel-
atively low factor costs. The promise of exploiting lucrative opportunities 
leads fi rms to invest in the region, which business analysts have regarded 
* I thank the three anonymous reviewers for their comments on a previous version of this 
article. Special thanks to Sam Whittemore for his valuable research assistance. All errors 
that remain are the author’s responsibility.
1. FDI is defi ned as private capital fl ows in the form of multinational fi rms purchasing or 
opening of new subsidiaries outside the home economy. The commonly accepted threshold 
for FDI is if the parent fi rm gains 10 percent or more of a controlling interest in a going con-
cern in a host economy. By its very nature, FDI is nonspeculative and long term.
Latin American Research Review, Vol. 43, No. 1. © 2008 by the Latin American Studies Association.
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for the past decade as an emerging area, second only to East Asia and 
India. Analysts of government bureaucracies and political institutions 
claim that foreign fi rms are well aware of the different levels of good gov-
ernance across the region and favor those states that have a proven track 
record of protecting property rights. In short, FDI responds to different 
dimensions of cost, risk, and opportunity. But what combination of factors 
best explains FDI fl ows to Latin America in the past two decades?
The three analytical dimensions of cost, risk, and opportunity con-
verge on the particular qualities of states and markets that shape the ex-
pectations of foreign fi rms. Markets that are unstable and impose exces-
sive start-up costs or that fail to provide adequate factors of production 
at a competitive price are less likely to attract FDI in a globalized “fl at 
world” where profi t margins are squeezed if fi rms are not swift and states 
are not shrewd (Strange 1992; Friedman 1999, 2005). Missed opportuni-
ties impose another layer of cost. In the rapidly changing world of global 
competition, not investing at the right time can prove as costly over the 
long term as moving into a market with initially uncompetitive condi-
tions (Schoenberger 1994). Of course, risk is the other side of opportunity. 
Firms that invest without guarantees against future expropriation and 
that face host governments that are highly corrupt and lack transparency 
may lose their competitive position even if market conditions are propi-
tious (Globerman and Shapiro 2002). States that embrace market-oriented 
reforms make the most credible commitments to foreign investors that 
they will be welcomed for the long haul (Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pa-
shamova 1998). Macroeconomic reform and deregulation will reduce risks 
as well as costs, whereas reforms that create new market opportunities, 
such as privatization, may enable FDI where it was previously limited or 
forbidden.
Since the 1980s, Latin America has been one of the more challenging 
markets for managers of multinational corporations (MNCs) as they cal-
culate costs, risks, and opportunities. To a great extent, the view of the 
region from abroad has been colored by Latin America’s periods of in-
tense macroeconomic crisis. Even in economies such as Mexico, Brazil, 
and Argentina, where fundamentals such as the size of the domestic mar-
ket, labor costs, and a commitment to structural adjustment reform have 
been more or less consistent throughout the 1990s, periodic fi nancial melt-
downs and contagion from the crises of other regions such as Southeast 
Asia and Russia, have reversed some of the gains made from reform or 
undermined the comparative advantages of countries in the region. As-
sessment of the particular determinants of costs, risks, and opportuni-
ties for investment is costly, and often MNCs have relied on sustained 
good macroeconomic performance to gauge the overall readiness of Latin 
American countries for FDI.
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This study tests various propositions that fl ow from the myriad log-
ics of costs, risks, and opportunities, comparing the explanatory power 
of these hypotheses to a baseline expectation that good macroeconomic 
performance predicts FDI infl ows. The analysis fi nds that macroeconomic 
stability is a key condition of increased FDI, but specifi cally it is the con-
sistent performance of the current account that matters most. That is, 
the reduction of trade imbalances in particular and the attendant need 
to fi nance them sends the strongest signal to foreign investors of a more 
generalized commitment by Latin American governments to sound and 
sustainable macroeconomic policies.
Two mutually reinforcing logics exist to support this conclusion. First, 
foreign investors understand that the Latin American region in particu-
lar has a history of fi nancing current account defi cits in an unsustainable 
manner. Investors in the region have memories of the yawning current 
account defi cits of the late import-substitution industrialization (ISI) pe-
riod that deepened balance of payments crises and led to the explosion of 
external debt and the collapse of the largest economies in the region dur-
ing the debt crisis of the 1980s. During the 1990s, current account defi cits 
led to the dependence on short-term, foreign currency-denominated, and 
indexed debt that played a key role in major fi nancial collapses such as 
Mexico’s Tequila Effect crisis in 1994–1995.2 The erosion of current account 
balances in states with high foreign and private debt commitments cre-
ates high ratios of debt to annual exports, a key indicator of an impending 
fi nancial crisis. For example, the Brazilian currency crisis of January 1999 
was preceded by months of growing public debt and eroding current ac-
counts. As the debt-to-export ratio grew, capital fl ight by investors put 
pressure on the central bank’s managed fl oating exchange-rate system, 
eventually causing its collapse. To be sure, investors’ anxieties had many 
causes, not least among them increasingly shaky exchange-rate regimes 
and overvalued currencies, as well as losses in other regions where emerg-
ing markets had their own meltdowns; however, the ever-worsening core 
indicator of how the macroeconomy was affecting the economic funda-
mentals of Latin American markets was the performance of the current 
account.
Second, current account performance is an indicator of a Latin Ameri-
can country’s orientation to global trade. During the 1990s, FDI increas-
ingly returned to the region. Much of this new investment involved the 
placement of manufacturing facilities designed to globally source trans-
national production (Green 1998; Tuman and Morris 1998). Latin Ameri-
can countries that made a commitment to open markets, particularly by 
2. On the role of the current account as a cause of the Mexican peso crisis, see Edwards 
(1997) and Teichman (2001, 148).
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signing regional trade agreements (RTAs), and to facilitating export per-
formance would become the chief benefi ciaries of the global distribution 
of production. However, RTA cooperation has tended to break down in 
Latin America when macroeconomic performance weakens (Eichengreen 
2004). For example, periodic current account defi cits have caused Brazil 
and Argentina to reverse their commitments to Mercosur a number of 
times since 1995 (Carranza 2003). In this sense, the current account is not 
just an indicator of a commitment to market-oriented reform but also a 
guarantor of a sustainable orientation to the new international division 
of labor.
The size and level of development of the country, the degree to which 
the host economy is globalized in terms of trade, and the degree of its 
overall growth are weaker predictors of FDI fl ows than is the record of 
the country’s trade balance over time. Although some scholars favor cost-
sensitive and risk-averse behavior as key explanatory variables, this study 
fi nds that good governance and regulatory and fi scal costs are relatively 
inconsequential. The FDI fl ows tend toward the politically less transpar-
ent (perhaps less democratic) countries in the region, but when progress 
on economic reform is considered, regime effects are unimportant. More-
over, reform by itself or in concert with good macroeconomic performance 
does not stand out as a suffi cient determinant of FDI fl ows.
The study uses panel data for fi fteen Latin American countries from 
1985 to 2003. This period encompasses the region’s initial recovery from 
the debt crisis of the early 1980s, the subsequent return of foreign inves-
tors to the region, the recovery from the recession of the early 1990s, and 
the multiple fi nancial crises that pervaded the developing world and 
Latin America in particular from 1995 through 2002. The period under 
study also captures the initiation and consolidation of market-oriented 
reforms throughout the region. The cross-sectional range of the data set 
includes the largest economies that engaged in the ISI development model 
that dominated the industrial histories of Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Uru-
guay, and Chile; the extractive-industrial economies of Peru, Ecuador, and 
Bolivia; oil economies such as Venezuela; and the largely export-oriented 
economies of Colombia, the Dominican Republic, and Central America.3
Much of the existing scholarship on the causes of FDI fl ows in Latin 
America has framed the main arguments with some mixture of the logics 
of costs, risks, and opportunities. The subsequent section uses this rubric 
to organize a review of the state of the art. I outline several hypotheses 
emanating from the cost-, risk-, and opportunity-oriented factors that are 
tested in the multivariate statistical analysis that follows against the base-
line expectation that macroeconomic performance is the chief determi-
3.  The other countries in the study not specifi cally named here are Paraguay, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, and Honduras.
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nant. The fi nal sections discuss the results of the quantitative tests and 
render some conclusions.
THE DETERMINANTS OF FDI IN LATIN AMERICA
Multinational corporations do not make investment decisions auton-
omously, nor are their investments wholly dependent on the planning 
and skills of corporate managers. Foreign subsidiaries are embedded 
in the economic, institutional, and cultural contexts of host economies, 
and the evolution of their investments is intimately linked to these fac-
tors (Doremus, Keller, Pauly, and Reich 1998). The expectations of foreign 
investors will center on their assessments of cost, risk, and opportunity, 
which are shaped by fi rm knowledge of the host economy, reputation, and 
estimations of future performance. Of course, this study recognizes that 
factors endogenous to the fi rm, such as corporate strategies for the esti-
mated advantages of owning subsidiaries, locating them in certain host 
economies, and the relative costs of alternatives to foreign ownership such 
as licensing and exporting, shape the decision making of MNCs (Dunning 
1981; Markusen and Maskus 1999). However, my concern here is with un-
derstanding the interactions between fi rm goals and the context of local 
economies that determine where fi rms will locate once they have decided 
to go abroad. I argue that the most relevant factors are exogenous to the 
particularities of what MNCs produce.4
Risk-based Factors
Multinational investors are most risk-sensitive before they commit 
their resources, because they know that they bear appreciable costs if they 
wish to invoke the exit option later. As Raymond Vernon (1971) argued 
famously in his classic study of FDI, MNCs are liquid ex ante but illiq-
uid ex post. This makes MNCs reluctant to invest without guarantees that 
host governments will act responsibly and protect their property. The ab-
sence of guarantees feeds a credibility gap in relationships between the 
host country and MNCs. The communication of a commitment to reform 
with an institutional change that signals the seriousness of host-country 
intentions is thus a sine qua non of overcoming the credibility gap (Ro-
drik 1989; Tures 2003). This is especially true for countries with a track 
record of macroeconomic instability. Investors are concerned that without 
a commitment to structural adjustment and macroeconomic reform, fu-
ture rates of return will fall in the face of policy backsliding and customer 
uncertainty.
4. The logic for separating the ex ante internal fi rm decisions to locate abroad and the ex 
post decision on where to locate is explained in Tuman and Emmert (2004, 12).
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Risk-based factors affect costs through a logic of hidden information. 
As in the classic principal-agent dilemma, fi rms (the principals) rely on 
governments (the agents) to protect their property and to secure stable 
market conditions. Yet only governments know what they will do under 
certain conditions. Governments that entertain radical and arbitrary shifts 
in economic policy that may be popular but are not sustained by mar-
ket forces erode investor confi dence. Polities rife with corruption impose 
costs of hidden information as well, because investors cannot know ex 
ante what their true costs will be. In addition, MNCs value predictability 
of the future and consistency with the past, so it follows that arbitrary rule 
is second best. Of course, that makes the role of regime type more diffi -
cult to assess because democracies institutionalize uncertainty of political 
outcomes, whereas authoritarian regimes are capable of arbitrary shifts in 
policy without the institutional checks that make change more diffi cult in 
more transparent polities.
Scholars have historically been divided on the question of whether 
democracies or authoritarian regimes are better at attracting FDI.5 Re-
grettably, neither the historical record nor the weight of scholarship has 
resolved the matter. Latin America’s military dictatorships of the 1960s 
and 1970s were regarded as the stewards of stable investment climates 
because of their ability to repress labor and guarantee government stabil-
ity. The acute failures of radical neoliberal projects in Argentina and Chile 
(post-1983) and the crisis of ISI and debt in Brazil and Mexico during the 
1980s raised questions about the alleged superior ability of authoritarians 
to manage the economy (Hartlyn and Morley 1986; Frieden 1991). Transi-
tions to democracy in all the Latin American countries after 1985 made 
the regime-type variable less available for testing. Yet scholars asked to 
what extent the consolidation of democracy affected FDI infl ows. For 
example, Jensen (2003) argued that polities with more transparent rules 
enhance predictability and reduce political risk. One mechanism is the 
number of institutional veto players in more democratic systems. As the 
number of veto players increases, arbitrary shifts in economic policy be-
come less likely (Henisz 2000). Yet democracy also dissuades investors 
seeking oligopolistic opportunities and provides avenues for domestic 
fi rms to pressure politicians to increase protectionist regulations (Li and 
Renick 2003, 177).
The present study does not seek to resolve the debate over the specifi c 
factors that might link regime type with FDI infl ows. As noted subse-
5. For evidence supporting the benefi ts of authoritarianism for investment returns and 
climate, see Oneal (1994) and Tuman and Emmert (2004). On the trouble democracies have 
in providing favorable investment climates, see Li and Resnick (2003). For arguments on 
behalf of democracy, see Jensen (2003), Tures (2003), and Rodrik (2000). For a country-by-
country analysis in Latin America that illustrates how mixed the evidence is for the regime 
variable, see Heo and DeRouen (2002).
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quently, the models will include distinct indicators of democratization to 
test the extent to which they affect aggregate infl ows. Moreover, several of 
the characteristics attributed to democracy, such as transparency and rela-
tively low levels of corruption, may be obtained in undemocratic cases. 
Whenever possible, then, regime factors and other risk-mitigating vari-
ables should be tested as separate variables. This is especially important 
when testing for institutions that protect property rights as opposed to 
civil and political rights and institutions that make corruption costs low 
but do not necessarily enhance political representation.
Political risks can come in many forms. Often the most credible com-
mitment that states can make to investors is to secure property rights. 
Investor confi dence is likely to be greater in economies where regimes sel-
dom challenge property rights. Because expropriation has been a histori-
cal tendency in Latin America and continues in some countries (e.g., Evo 
Morales’s Bolivia), the securing of property rights for foreign investors 
remains a key explanatory variable in the region (Biglaiser and DeRouen 
2006; Tuman and Emmert 1999, 2004; Globerman and Shapiro 2002; Tures 
2003; Li and Resnick 2003).
Corruption is another source of political risk that can generate unfore-
seen costs. In their study, Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova (1998) found 
that countries with a reputation for corruption dissuade FDI infl ows. Wei 
(2000) quantifi es these costs by comparing the effects of corruption on FDI 
to hikes in marginal corporate tax rates. He fi nds that an increase of one 
unit on an index of corruption is equivalent to the effects of a 6 percent 
increase in tax rates on FDI infl ows.
Assessment of risk depends upon expectations of how institutions in 
the host economy will protect private assets. Consequently, foreign inves-
tors are likely to hedge their bets by choosing to invest in countries that 
provide access to redress if the MNC is wronged. The availability of a 
“governance infrastructure” of legal procedures and professional judicial 
and law enforcement institutions provides one source of adjudicatory 
action (Globerman and Shapiro 2002, 1901–1902). Of course, this may be 
of little value if the concern is expropriation, which is most often done 
through legal and legislative channels. Yet an offi cial commitment to law 
and order is important to prevent unproductive costs such as bribes and 
kickbacks. Such costs can be appreciable in Latin America, a region whose 
countries Transparency International rates high on its corruption index.
Cost-sensitive Factors
Foreign investors value the ability to make decisions concerning the 
allocation of their resources free of undue legal and fi scal constraints. 
Some scholars of FDI infl ows in Latin America have argued for the causal 
importance of economic freedom as a major inducement of MNCs 
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(Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles 2003). The focus of such works is on liber-
alization and deregulation, which reduce the costs of investment in the 
short and long terms. Financial and trade liberalization, reductions in 
marginal corporate taxes, and labor market reforms are the three areas 
most often mentioned in the relevant literature as cost-mitigating factors 
that fl ow from higher levels of economic freedom.
Although the freedom to move capital presents a greater incentive to 
portfolio investors, MNCs are also sensitive to restrictions on capital fl ows. 
Subsidiaries wish to be able to repatriate profi ts, an erstwhile criticism of 
FDI that remains relevant. Firms also value the ability to buy and move 
assets within equity markets or in private contracts and sales without the 
undue interference of government. Liberalization reforms that lower re-
serve requirements, eliminate controls on interest rates, and ease manda-
tory lending practices allow foreign fi rms and investors to move capital 
more freely. Studies of FDI in Latin America demonstrate that these re-
forms are predictors of FDI infl ows (Trevino et al. 2002; Cuadros, Orts, 
and Alguacil 2004; Asiedu and Lien 2004).
The role of commercial liberalization as a determinant of FDI in Latin 
America has evolved over time. Trade liberalization might have been a 
disincentive to FDI during Latin America’s ISI period, when MNCs in-
vested in Brazil, Mexico, and other large economies to avoid high tariff 
barriers and to gain access to domestic markets. Lower tariffs would have 
undercut the competitive position of these subsidiaries by exposing them 
to imports. However, in post-ISI Latin America, MNCs are as inclined to 
export from the region using the advantages provided by lower factor 
costs as to exploit the domestic market. Lower tariff barriers also reduce 
input costs for component parts and capital goods that can be made more 
cheaply elsewhere. Trade liberalization thereby promotes global sourcing 
and the use of Latin American countries as export platforms for consumer 
durables such as automobiles and consumer nondurables such as foot-
wear and textiles (Tuman and Emmert 2004, 20).6 Liberalization in Latin 
America should then increase capital fl ows, FDI included (Cuadros, Orts, 
and Alguacil 2004).
Fiscal incentives involving relatively low marginal corporate tax rates 
and even direct subsidies provided by government policy can also play 
a role in providing incentives to foreign investors. Although they posit a 
nonlinear relation between tax rates and FDI infl ows, Gastanaga, Nugent, 
and Pashamova (1998) found that at marginal rates, greater than 25–35 
percent, multinational investment falls strongly. That bodes well for Latin 
America, because taxes on corporate profi ts fell from 1985 to 1999 through-
out the region, except in Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay. Rates increased 
6. The ease of global sourcing is a key premise of buyer-driven and producer-driven 
“global commodity chains” in Latin America and elsewhere. See Gereffi  (2001).
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in the fi rst case and remained stable in the latter two (Lora 2001, 13). This 
has happened as all states in the region have enacted tax abatements and 
other fi scal incentives to spur investment in strategic sectors such as min-
ing, tourism, and petroleum refi ning.
The role of labor market reforms in enticing FDI is less certain than the 
other areas of reform. In part, this is because Latin America has made little 
headway in easing the costs of hiring and fi ring (Lora 2001, 17–18). High 
nonsalary costs have produced numerous ineffi ciencies in formal market 
employment. These are diffi cult to measure and compare across countries, 
yet aggregate measures of the extent to which labor market regulations 
have been eased are available as a proxy for reducing labor costs.
Opportunities
Consistent with the signaling logic followed by Rodrik (1989) and oth-
ers, proponents of economic reform hold that host economies can enhance 
the credibility of their commitments to maintain a favorable investment 
climate by “tying their hands” with institutional changes. Legal and legis-
lative commitments to liberalize markets, deregulate banking and fi nan-
cial transactions, privatize public fi rms, reduce marginal corporate taxes, 
and reform labor markets to ease restrictions on hiring and fi ring enhance 
MNCs’ confi dence that market conditions will remain propitious for long-
term investment. The effects of fi nancial deregulation, lower taxes and fi s-
cal incentives, and labor-market reform were discussed in a previous sec-
tion as the central cost-mitigating factors to be tested. Here, the focus is on 
privatization, which is an area of economic reform that not only reduces 
costs and mitigates risks but also creates new opportunities for profi t.
Privatization not only signals foreign fi rms that the erstwhile role of 
the state in the economy will weaken but also provides opportunities for 
foreign fi rms to invest in new markets, and perhaps under conditions that 
immediately enhance the market power of MNCs. This can be especially 
true in areas recently opened to foreign investment, such as petroleum 
refi ning and mining. Public-private concessions in infrastructure and 
telecommunications open the door to potentially massive investments. 
Moreover, the modalities of sale can encourage ever-larger commitments 
by foreigners through subsidized pricing. For example, the Brazilian steel 
fi rms were sold during the early to mid-1990s after the state spent hun-
dreds of millions of dollars to reconvert these going concerns and then 
auctioned them off at subsidized prices to encourage both domestic and 
foreign fi rms to buy into the sector (Montero 1998). Whether through the 
opening of new areas or the provision of subsidies, privatization in Latin 
America is credited with providing 36 percent of the region’s FDI from 
initial sales and more than that in complementary investments fl owing 
from buyouts (Lora 2001, 16; Trevino, Daniel, and Arbeláez 2002).
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Scholars, however, disagree about whether reforms such as privatiza-
tion and liberalization matter or even whether they increase rather than 
reduce FDI infl ows. Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) found that none of the 
major areas of economic reform proved necessary for attracting FDI. Yet 
this outcome may depend on the particular opportunities created by re-
form and their timing. Tuman and Emmert (1999, 543) concluded that if re-
forms undermine the buying power of consumers, they will dissuade FDI 
oriented toward production for the domestic market. This often happens 
during adjustment periods, although postadjustment FDI often picks up. 
Therefore, the study of fl ows several years after reforms are enacted may 
show a positive relationship among liberalization, deregulation, and FDI.
This is an argument for using longer time frames in subsequent re-
search. The role of privatization is especially sensitive to the time-frame 
factor. The Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) study examined FDI fl ows 
through 1995, but this temporal range leaves out much of the privatization 
process in the region, especially in Brazil. If privatization produces new 
markets and so many of these reforms postdate the mid-1990s, a more 
updated study is necessary to ascertain how much these reforms have 
induced FDI fl ows across Latin America.
The possible range of opportunities created by host government policy 
is certainly broader than the market-creating effects produced by privati-
zation. Numerous qualitative studies of industrial clusters, export process-
ing zones, and targeted industrial policies in Latin America have shown 
that FDI fl ows can sometimes be affected by a host of government policies 
(Mortimore and Vergara 2004). Nevertheless, systematic data that covers 
the time period and the countries under study here are not available on 
the full array of relevant government policies. Given that the design and 
implementation of these policies is often a determinant of their effective-
ness, it is not apparent how industrial policies meant for FDI promotion 
might be operationalized for the purposes of comparative testing. Because 
the richness of the qualitative studies cannot be replicated here, the mod-
els will not specify particularities of industrial policy.
Macroeconomic Stability and Factor Controls
Differences in market size, level of development, and gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth provide fundamental incentives to foreign fi rms 
to locate their investments in particular countries. Large domestic mar-
kets such as Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico lure consumer goods MNCs 
interested in exploiting large economies of scale.7 Relatively high tariffs in 
7. Several studies of FDI in Latin America fi nd that market size is important. See Trevino, 
Daniels, and Arbeláez (2002) and Trevino et al. (2002). For an empirical study that estab-
lishes the general fi nding for 135 countries, see Chakrabarti (2001).
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the host economy make this move especially strategic. The greater is the 
level of development, the more diverse is the array of products that may 
be sold in domestic markets and the greater is the range of worker skill 
sets available to sustain multiple segments of production (Globerman and 
Shapiro 2002, 1905). Sustained growth provides the promise of expand-
ing opportunities. Growth in terms of GDP per capita is an indicator of 
a maturing market that can support growing economies of scale for ever 
more sophisticated consumer products (Tuman and Emmert 2004). All 
three of these variables can be expected to have a positive effect on FDI 
infl ows.
Exchange-rate regimes are another area of concern for foreign investors. 
As with tariff and tax rates, governments can change exchange rates with 
devaluations or appreciations that can affect the bottom line of MNCs. 
Appreciations will reduce import costs and thereby spur further invest-
ment, while devaluations can make exported products more competitive 
internationally (Görg and Wakelin 2001). During the initial stages of in-
vestment, devaluations can reduce start-up costs. Periodic (and predict-
able) adjustments are less problematic than high variability in exchange 
rates. The latter can be a symptom of eroding macroeconomic stability 
and a predecessor to fi nancial crisis that can undermine the domestic 
customer base and affect import and export costs. Similarly, wholesale 
and consumer infl ation can produce uncertainty, thereby signaling a lack 
of discipline in monetary policy. Numerous econometric studies of FDI 
fl ows have found that these sources of macroeconomic instability are cru-
cial determinants of whether MNCs invest (Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles 
2003; Trevino, Daniels, and Arbeláez 2002).
Much scholarship on government size and globalization argues that 
public expenditures can affect investment fl ows.8 On the one hand, high 
levels of government consumption can dissuade foreign investment by 
“crowding out” local sources of capital and undermining fi nancial re-
forms aimed at reducing the cost of domestic capital (Biglaiser and DeR-
ouen 2006, 53). On the other hand, the provision of public goods such 
as education and infrastructure can scale up the productivity of econo-
mies, making them more attractive to high-end producers. Fully testing 
this variable would require disaggregating government expenditures by 
type, a task this study would prefer to leave to future research. Lacking 
the space to pursue this question in greater detail, we use the aggregate 
measure of government consumption and leave the results open to in-
terpretation. Government consumption can also be evaluated in terms 
of fi scal defi cits and debt service. Countries that are saddled with large 
8. A related variable is government defi cits, although empirical studies have shown 
that this control variable is less important than government consumption. See Jensen 
(2003, 599).
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defi cits and heavy ratios of debt to export earnings may be less attractive 
to MNCs than countries that have a more stable fi scal profi le.
Another set of controls that one must consider for FDI is factor endow-
ments. Economies that are highly urban and have a large manufacturing 
base will likely attract a greater array of fi rms and therefore a larger pool 
of investment over time. The presence of natural resources may draw in 
foreign investors independent of government policy or institutional attri-
butes (Jensen 2003, 598). For example, fi rms from resource-poor countries 
such as Japan might be motivated to pursue investments in primary and 
extractive industries in Latin America (Tuman and Emmert 1999, 542). 
Labor costs might become a draw for FDI. Although convention holds 
that relative wage rates are a chief lure for foreign investors, studies dem-
onstrate that this factor does not trump the others listed previously, and 
there is considerable evidence demonstrating that it is offset by political 
and institutional factors (Jensen 2003).9 An alternative measure, the skills 
base of the population, could be a predictor of FDI. That is, MNCs are 
more likely to invest in countries with highly skilled workforces because 
these workers more easily increase productivity and thereby enhance the 
competitiveness of exports (Tuman and Emmert 2004, 20). Anticipating 
that the availability of skilled labor is greater in more urban and industri-
alized countries, I use these factor controls as proxies for average work-
force skills.
Some scholars see export-oriented development in the region as com-
mensurate with a larger strategy of reducing fears of expropriation and 
reinforcing investor trust in Latin America (Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006, 
53). This follows the work of Chakrabarti (2001), who found that trade ori-
entation was a key predictor in his study of 135 countries. Yet an export-
led economy may not be as important as the consistent performance of 
the current account balance, which refl ects a broader array of indicators of 
macroeconomic stability, commitments to liberalization, and market com-
petitiveness. Trevino et al. (2002) found that larger current account defi cits 
are associated with higher FDI infl ows. Yet this depends on when trade 
defi cits appear. If they exist and are notable before FDI infl ows increase, 
then the relevant logic may be that governments encourage investment 
through a host of policies to attract the capital needed to fi nance the extant 
balance of payment imbalances (Trevino, Daniels, and Arbeláez 2002, 32). 
Alternatively, if current account performance is a hallmark of macroeco-
nomic stability, then shrinking defi cits or growing surpluses would signal 
MNCs that the economy in question is not likely to become a victim to 
a liquidity crisis in foreign reserves. An improved current account bal-
9. Chakrabarti’s (2001) review of the economic literature found as many studies that re-
garded high relative labor costs as either a positive factor or insignifi cant as those that 
found evidence for the negative correlation of conventional wisdom.
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ance indicates that governments have made an institutional commitment 
to liberalization and that domestic economies are in an increasingly more 
competitive position in global markets. That may all be true if the econ-
omy is simply export oriented, but the balance of payments must also be 
tested to get a broader sense of the fi scal and competitive implications of 
the current account. Both export orientation and favorable current account 
balances, small defi cits, or growing surpluses should correlate positively 
with FDI infl ows.
Exchange-rate regimes and the balance of trade have, especially since 
1995 in Latin America, been linked to the advent of fi nancial crises in the 
region. All these crises, from the Mexican Tequila Effect crisis to the crisis 
of the Brazilian real in 1999 to the fi nancial meltdown in Argentina in 
2001–2002, reduced the confi dence of foreign investors, if only for a while. 
Assuming that MNCs are affected by the same herd mentality that af-
fl icts portfolio investors, we might ask whether these crisis periods had 
sustained effects on larger patterns of FDI infl ows.10
VARIABLES AND DATA
Of the two major sources of data on FDI infl ows in Latin America, the 
World Bank and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD), I follow the convention in much of the scholarship and 
use data on net annual FDI infl ows taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators (WDI).11 Each value is standardized as a percentage 
of GDP.
Risk-mitigating Factors
The scholarship on the role of risk-mitigating factors in FDI fl ows pre-
dicts that the existence of an institutional environment guaranteeing 
transparency, protection of property rights and a low incidence of ex-
propriation, the availability of legal recourse, and a commitment to law 
and order enhance foreign investment. Institutional variables in large-N 
cross-sectional studies of FDI fl ows tend to use metaindices to measure 
governance. Indices of corruption are the best known. Following the work 
of Wei (2000), I employ one of the three major indices, the PRS Risk Group 
measure, but I also use two other indices provided by the PRS and one b y 
the Fraser Institute to fl esh out other dimensions of good governance. The 
10. Several recent studies that use data up to 1995 (e.g., Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006) do 
not test for the major fi nancial crises that have affl icted the region.
11. The data set also includes infl ow data as reported by UNCTAD, but running that vari-
able as the dependent variable did not produce any differences in the statistical results. I 
chose the WDI data as this is the source used by most other empirical studies (e.g., Biglaiser 
and DeRouen 2006; Jensen 2003).
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International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) of the PRS Risk Group measures 
several governance indicators by assigning risk ratings over time. The 
ICRG metrics for corruption and a country’s commitment to law and order 
work on a 0–6 scale, with the higher numbers indicating lower corruption 
(e.g., low incidence of bribery) and a strong dedication to impartial legal 
processes. The indicator for risk in the investment climate is based on the 
potential for expropriation, the relative ease with which profi ts may be 
repatriated, and average delays in payments. I use the aggregate indicator 
based on a 0–12 scale as a proxy for expropriation risk, which increases as 
values approximate zero. I also employ the Fraser Institute’s index of ju-
dicial development to gauge the extent to which transparency-enhancing 
institutions are suffi ciently available in each country-year.12
Following the practice of scholars who have focused on the effects of 
democratization on capital fl ows (e.g., Jensen 2003), I use Polity IV mea-
sures as a metric of democratic deepening. Polity IV codes democracy on 
a range from −10 (autocracy) to 10 (democracy). I rescaled this variable 
on a 0–20 scale to facilitate interpretation. Tuman (2006) notes that Polity 
IV measures restraints on executives and not abuses of civil and political 
rights that sensitivity analyses have shown have a statistically signifi cant 
effect on infl ows of U.S. FDI. As per Tuman’s recommendation, I test the 
degree to which political and civil rights are abused by integrating Free-
dom House (FH) and Political Terror Scale data.13
Cost-mitigating Factors
The most prominent indicators of economic freedom are usually tied 
to the costs of moving capital and hiring and fi ring as well as to marginal 
corporate tax rates. In their study, Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) used 
the aggregate Fraser Institute index for economic freedom, but they did 
not employ the more specifi c subindices. These provide a more precise 
set of indicators of cost and risk factors. Fraser includes two indices that 
gauge the level of regulation of capital fl ows and the weight of corporate 
12. Because the Fraser Institute reports most of its data in fi ve-year increments before 
2000, I used a linear interpolation equation to calculate the missing values between 1985 and 
1999. Due to collinearity with the PRC’s legal index, I ran these in two separate models.
13. I employ three variables: (1) the FH political rights score that ranges from 1 to 7 and 
(2) the FH civil rights score with the same range. For both scales, a rating of 1 indicates 
the highest degree of freedom and 7 the least amount of freedom. The third variable is 
the Political Terror scale, which is taken from the average of the Amnesty International 
and State Department scores reported by Mark Gibney. The scale ranges from 1 to 5, with 
higher numbers indicating a greater incidence of political imprisonment, torture, and other 
offi cial violence. See http://www.unca.edu/politicalscience/images/Colloquium/faculty-
staff/gibney. html. All three indices were rescaled to use zero as their base. Preliminary 
tests of multicollinearity determined that the Polity IV variable and the FH political rights 
score were strongly related. Subsequent tests ran these variables in separate models.
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taxes.14 Because the data prior to 2000 is reported in fi ve-year intervals, 
linear interpolation was used to fi ll in missing values.
Reform
Economic reform affects both cost-mitigating factors and opportuni-
ties. Therefore, indices of progress on reform in different areas should re-
fl ect changes in relative costs for investment and, especially in the area of 
privatization, relative opportunities. This study employs reform indices 
produced by Lora (2001). The chief alternative indices created by Morley, 
Machado, and Pettinato (1999) cover seventeen countries from 1970 to 1995. 
Lora (2001), however, offers as many or more countries for each reform in-
dex and the data extend to 1999 in most cases. Indices are available for trade 
liberalization, tax reform, fi nancial liberalization, privatization, and labor 
market reform. Each index is standardized on a scale ranging from zero to 
one, with higher values indicating greater progress toward reform.
Macroeconomic Factors
Market size (GDPlog) and level of development (GDP per capitalog) are 
measured following the convention in the literature (Jensen 2003, 598; 
Globerman and Shapiro 2002). Chakrabarti (2001, 98) argues that both GDP 
and per capita GDP are measures of two key dimensions of market size—
population and income, respectively—so they should be tested as separate 
variables. This study will do so with logged values for each. Other con-
trols in the study include growth in GDP, price stability (infl ation rates), 
exchange-rate variability, and growth in government expenditures as a 
percentage of GDP. I employ foreign exchange cross-rates as a measure of 
appreciation of the national currency against the dollar. Because extreme 
values can distort the data, I use the natural log of the exchange rate. 
Exchange-rate variability is the standard deviation of the logged average 
annual cross-rate and its two previous annual values. Higher dispersion 
values indicate greater variability. Finally, I include fi scal defi cits as a per-
centage of GDP as a fi scal control.15
Regarding factor costs, the list of controls includes the percentage of the 
population that is urban, value added by manufacturing as a percentage 
of GDP, and two controls for oil and ore exports as percentages of mer-
chandise exports. Given that oil industries tend to be nationally owned, 
14. These are based on a 0–10 scale, with higher numbers indicating greater economic 
freedom. I omitted the scores for labor market regulations because the data were not com-
plete enough across countries.
15. All economic data come from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators except 
the defi cit data, which come from the International Monetary Fund’s International Financial 
Statistics.
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FDI in natural resources has concentrated in mining in Latin America. To 
be sure, there are notable exceptions such as Chilean nitrates and copper, 
which are nationally owned. Yet ore and metals exports as a percentage 
of all merchandise exports are a reasonable proxy for the role that natural 
resources might play in luring FDI.16 Following the work of Jensen (2003), 
I add fuel exports as a percentage of all merchandise exports to test for the 
effect that oil receipts might have in weakening demand for foreign capi-
tal or for the role that FDI in oil refi ning, natural gas, and services might 
have in pulling in new investment.
Trade orientation is another area to consider for controls. Specifi cations 
using exports and imports as separate variables invite multicollinearity, 
so I use total trade as a percentage of GDP as a proxy for integration into 
global markets (Trevino, Daniels, and Arbeláez 2002, 36). To assess the 
role of the balance of trade, I include current account defi cits as a percent-
age of GDP. More than a control, I posit that this factor is an explanatory 
variable.
Country- and period-specifi c factors may condition FDI infl ows. First, 
the study considers the role of time periods by including dummies for 
three phases: (1) 1985–1990 (a period of recession in Latin America), (2) 
1991–1994 (a period of economic recovery), and (3) 1995–2003 (a period of 
fi nancial uncertainty). The third period is specifi ed further with dummies 
for years in which particular fi nancial crises affected the region: Brazil 
(1988), Mexico (1994–1995), Asia (1997–1998), Russia (1998), Brazil (1999), 
and Argentina (2001–2002). Second, the study includes a dummy for each 
country.
Assuming that countries that MNCs favored in the past will be so fa-
vored over time, I expect that the lag of FDI infl ows will be signifi cant and 
positive. The data set does not differentiate by origin of FDI fl ows; that 
is, the effects of “home” country characteristics. The dependent variable 
is pooled FDI fl ows from different countries. Tuman (2006, 185) argues 
that such pooling omits important factors such as political structures, dif-
ferences in corporate governance, and public (consumer) pressure in the 
home economy. Given the complexity of the models tested here, I leave the 
task of respecifying the dependent variable by fl ows from certain home 
economies to future research. Nevertheless, Tuman’s admonition is a valu-
able one that should inform replication of the models tested here.
METHOD
Most large-N studies of FDI infl ows embrace panel studies as superior 
to cross-sectional analysis (e.g., Gastanaga, Nugent, and Pashamova 1998, 
16. The alternative measure found in the literature is all primary exports, which seems 
too broad because it includes agriculture.
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1300). Scholars of FDI and those concerned with the effects of market-
oriented reforms on growth typically justify this practice by pointing out 
that outcomes are often period and/or country dependent (Cuadros, Orts, 
and Alguacil 2004, 168). This underscores the importance of using time-
series cross-sectional (TSCS) techniques. Ordinary least squares (OLS) 
with the panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) procedure can correct for 
overly optimistic error estimates found in the sole use of conventional 
OLS techniques (Beck and Katz 1995). Following other studies of FDI in 
Latin America (e.g., Biglaiser and DeRouen 2006), I include the lag of the 
dependent variable to correct for AR(1) serial autocorrelation. Further-
more, the independent variables are lagged to limit possible endogene-
ity. I specify models that include mixtures of the relevant independent 
variables and controls so as to minimize multicollinearity. Preliminary 
tests showed that the primary areas of collinearity are between market 
size and factor controls (e.g., GDP size and percentage of the population 
that is urban), the Polity IV and FH political rights scale (although not the 
FH civil rights scale or terror scale), and governance and reform variables 
that are run in separate models (for the correlation matrix, see Appendix 
table 2).17 Some of the costs and reform variables (e.g., fi nancial reform 
and fi nancial regulations) were collinear so they were not run in the same 
specifi cations. Time period and country dummies are omitted from the 
presentation of results to simplify the table.
RESULTS
Table 1 presents the test results of fi ve models. The fi rst governance 
model includes the risk-mitigating factors plus the market size and mac-
roeconomic policy controls. The second governance model adds two cost 
factors (tax burden and fi nancial regulation), and the third governance 
model tests the same independent variables but with the factor cost con-
trols and without the market size variables known to produce collinearity 
problems. The fi nal two models test the reform variables. The fi rst speci-
fi cation includes three governance controls (Polity IV, civil liberties, and 
terror scale) and the market size and macroeconomic policy controls.18 The 
second omits the market size variables and includes the factor cost controls.
The three governance models produce little evidence that the major 
risk-mitigating institutions in Latin America affect FDI fl ows. Although 
17. Following the work of Chakrabarti (2001), I run GDP and GDP per capita as separate 
variables in the same models despite their collinearity. I did test the two governance and 
the fi rst reform models by running only one or the other of these variables. The results 
did not change. When I dropped the period and country dummies, only privatization was 
signifi cant and then only at the .1 level.
18. The FH civil liberties scale is omitted from the table to facilitate the presentation. This 
variable was insignifi cant in all model specifi cations.
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Table 1 Results of Model Tests
  Governance Governance
 Governance 1 + Cost 1 + Cost 2 Reform 1 Reform 2
FDIlagged 0.372** 0.358** 0.300** 0.132 0.170
 (0.147) (0.152) (0.151) (0.322) (0.257)
Corruption 0.449 0.405 0.344
 (0.275) (0.273) (0.408)
Legal System 0.129 0.091 0.235
 (0.237) (0.246) (0.256)
Investment 
 Climate 0.040 0.024 0.076
 (0.108) (0.107) (0.109)
Polity IV −0.152* −0.14* −0.155* −0.066 −0.130
 (0.086) (0.083) (0.079) (0.114) (0.140)
Terror Scale 0.239* 0.209* 0.156 0.382 0.067
 (0.124) (0.123) (0.124) (0.271) (0.143)
Tax Burden  −0.166 −0.036
  (0.156) (0.208)
Financial 
 Regulation  0.156 0.177
  (0.116) (0.175)
Tax Reform    −0.838 −0.546
    (4.092) (5.434)
Trade 
 Liberalization    0.085 0.356
    (2.778) (2.731)
Financial 
 Reform    0.585 0.678
    (1.867) (2.109)
Privatization    4.927 3.159
    (3.121) (2.327)
Labor Reform    −0.257 0.024
    (4.826) (4.484)
GDPlog −0.071 0.005  0.867
 (2.175) (2.137)  (4.100)
GDP per 
 Capitalog 1.060 1.016  4.213
 (1.627) (1.695)  (3.303)
Infl ation 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Exchange-Rate −0.305 −0.295 −0.262 −0.184 −0.252
 Variance (0.381) (0.384) (0.313) (0.596) (0.468)
Fiscal Defi cits 0.027 0.022 −0.006 −0.013 −0.042
 (0.055) (0.055) (0.080) (0.101) (0.131)
(continued)
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Table 1 (Continued)
  Governance Governance
 Governance 1 + Cost 1 + Cost 2 Reform 1 Reform 2
Current 
 Account 0.059** 0.067** 0.066** 0.092** 0.078*
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) (0.041)
Trade/GDP 
 Ratio 0.011 0.003 0.011 −0.015 0.014
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.031) (0.039)
Urban 
 Density   −0.076  −0.026
   (0.128)  (0.261)
Manufacturing 
 Base   −0.100*  −0.091
   (0.057)  (0.124)
Ore Exports   −0.033  −0.147
   (0.050)  (0.097)
Fuel Exports   −0.050**  −0.023
   (0.022)  (0.025)
Constant −3.988 −4.306 6.466 −42.183 16.212
 (56.343) (55.608) (6.207) (84.426) (17.190)
N 219 219 199 176 159
R 2 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.72 0.72
Wald χ2 21941.9  6400.17 8.27E+06 100624.46 83.42
Prob > χ2 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Note: Primary numbers are regression coeffi cients with unbalanced data, and numbers in 
parentheses are panel-corrected standard errors.
 All tests are two-tailed: *signifi cant at .10; **signifi cant at .05.
all have the expected sign, all but the regime variables were statistically 
insignifi cant.19 The performance of the Polity IV and terror scale vari-
ables confi rms Tuman and Emmert’s (2004) conclusions that more auto-
cratic polities attract greater FDI. Yet the FH variables do not bear out Tu-
man’s (2006) expectations that it is limits on civil and political rights that 
are primarily responsible. Human rights violations may be important, 
but the impact of state-directed terror is inconsistent, as the third model 
demonstrates.20 The cost-mitigating factors were insignifi cant. Among the 
19. I omitted the Fraser Institute index for law and order from the presentation. It per-
formed similarly to the PRC’s legal system variable in all specifi cations.
20. I ran the FH variables in lieu of the Polity IV variable, and the political rights scale 
performed similarly to Polity scores.
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macroeconomic variables, only the performance of the current account re-
mains a robust predictor of FDI fl ows in the region. Market size and most 
of the macroeconomic performance controls do not register as important. 
On the basis of the third model, one might also claim that the less indus-
trialized countries depend more on FDI, an unsurprising fi nding once 
the market size controls are omitted. It is also not surprising that coun-
tries with less dependence on oil exports give FDI more weight in their 
economies.
The two reform models underscore that the institutional elements of 
domestic economies seem to carry little explanatory power when macro-
economic variables and factor controls are included. None of the reform 
variables are signifi cant. Privatization came the closest to achieving sta-
tistical signifi cance (p =  .114) in the fi rst model, but its role became in-
determinate in subsequent tests. It is notable that only the performance 
of the current account consistently explains FDI fl ows. When market 
size, macroeconomic policy, and factor controls are included, this vari-
able stands out as the most robust predictor, as well as in models with an 
improved goodness of fi t (R 2 =  .72) over the governance specifi cations.21 
The regime variables fail to achieve statistical signifi cance in the reform 
models.
CONCLUSIONS
Even when the degree of an economy’s integration into global markets, 
the level of development, and relative economic freedom are accounted for, 
it is the consistent performance on the current account that matters most 
to foreign investors. This fi nding is not altogether surprising, given that 
trade balances are one of the most apparent indicators of the performance 
of developing countries’ economies. Current account data is readily avail-
able to foreign investors, and such data can be used to track the market 
growth potential of a country over a relatively long period of time. His-
torically, in Latin America imbalances in the current account predict more 
fundamental problems in an economy. It is notable that current account 
imbalances preceded all the major fi nancial crises of the Latin American 
economies during the ISI period and during the more recent neoliberal 
reform period. Consequently, foreign investors may view low current ac-
count defi cits or even surpluses as credible signs of a sustained commit-
21. I retested all the models by dropping the current account variable to determine 
whether the other macroeconomic indicators became signifi cant. The lagged annual infl a 
tion variable did, once, in the Governance + Costs 2 model, and then only at the .1 level and 
the sign ran in the wrong direction. None of the other independent variables proved con-
sistently signifi cant in the retests.
P4552.indb   74 1/11/08   12:17:25 PM
DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 75
ment to good macroeconomic management. These conditions also signal 
MNCs interested in investing in growing intraregional trade and global 
sourcing chains of a given market’s competitiveness. None of this dis-
counts the logic of the risk- and cost-mitigating arguments for explaining 
MNC behavior. Foreign investors wish to hedge their bets in Latin Amer-
ica, but they regard more highly deeds in the economic sphere over deeds 
in the legislative and regulatory arenas and certainly over the words of 
host economy governments that they will engineer good governance and 
sustained reform with legislative changes.
How do the fi ndings of this study improve upon similarly compre-
hensive analyses of the empirical data that have been published recently? 
Three studies appear most relevant as candidates for comparison: those 
of (1) Trevino, Daniels, and Arbeláez (2002), (2) Tuman and Emmert (2004), 
and (3) Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006). Trevino, Daniels, and Arbeláez 
(2002) fi nd that the current account balance is insignifi cant, while priva-
tization reforms, market size, and percentage change in consumer prices 
are predictors of FDI infl ows. However, the authors choose not to lag their 
independent variables, a position inconsistent with the recommendations 
of Tuman and Emmert (2004, 16–15) among other studies. I replicated 
Trevino, Daniels, and Arbeláez’s study using similar measures for their 
variables and found that the current account balance had no effect in the 
unlagged test but was signifi cant at the .05 level when the variables were 
lagged. Trevino, Daniels, and Arbeláez (2002, 32) challenge the role of the 
current account further by suggesting that it is defi cits that encourage FDI, 
because imbalances create an incentive for governments to lure foreign 
capital. So does FDI improve the current account? I tested this proposition 
and found that FDI fl ows could not predict current account performance.22 
Finally, this study controls for each country as Trevino, Daniels, and Ar-
beláez do, although it tests fi fteen countries to their study’s seven, thereby 
picking up the experience of some of the smaller countries in the region 
included in the other two studies of comparison.
Tuman and Emmert (2004) do not test the performance of the current 
account per se, but they do include a trade openness variable in their 
lagged model. Their rationale only accepts part of the logic linking FDI to 
trade, namely the search for competitive markets. Liberalization, however, 
is not a guarantor of sustainable integration into international markets. 
Some econometric evidence confi rms that extensive liberalization of the 
economy can even undermine current account balances by causing im-
22. I ran models that regressed the current account on lagged FDI and models that in-
cluded macroeconomic controls, such as annual infl ation, exchange-rate variance, and fi s-
cal defi cits, and time period and country dummies. The instability of the exchange rate af-
fected the current account, as expected, but not FDI, infl ation, or defi cits.
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ports to rise more quickly than exports (Santos-Paulino 2004). This sug-
gests a trade-off at some point between liberalizing reforms and macro-
economic stability, which would explain the performance of the reform 
variables in comparison to the role of the current account, as well as the 
failure of trade orientation (trade/GDP) to achieve statistical signifi cance 
when the current account is included or excluded. The amount of variance 
explained in the dependent variable is another weak point in Tuman and 
Emmert’s study (an adjusted R 2 of .34), whereas this study and the other 
two mentioned above explain more than 60 percent of the variance of FDI 
fl ows in the region.
The more controversial fi nding underscored by Tuman and Emmert 
and unsupported by the current study is their conclusion that countries 
with poor human rights records tend to collect more FDI infl ows. The 
current study fi nds that infringements of political and civil rights and 
the relative level of political terror are not consistent predictors. Some of 
the results suggest that when factor costs are included, FDI fl ows fi gure 
more prominently in the less industrialized countries. These are also the 
Latin American states that tend to have the most problematic experiences 
with consolidating democracy. Certainly this is the case in the Andes and 
the Central American countries. Yet one might also ask if FDI tends to 
concentrate in those countries that are struggling democracies or whether 
those countries with more favorable current account performances are 
struggling democracies.23 Although I could not fi nd consistent evidence 
to support the claim, either by use of Polity IV or FH data, the question 
deserves more thorough empirical research than is possible here.
The weakness of the governance and reform variables in the statistical 
analysis is less mysterious because more studies have shown that these 
are inconsistent predictors. Although the present study confi rms the fi nd-
ings of Biglaiser and DeRouen (2006) that most economic reforms are not 
determinants of FDI infl ows, it raises doubts about the role of expropria-
tion risk, a factor these authors found signifi cant. Using the same data 
source to measure the variable, but extending the time period and adding 
other controls, this study could not confi rm the importance of this inde-
pendent variable. One reason for the different results is that my study 
employs country dummies, whereas Biglaiser and DeRouen eschew such 
controls. When my models drop the country dummies, investment cli-
mate and some of the reform variables, notably privatization, become sta-
tistically signifi cant. This suggests that the country dummies account for 
important differences among the cases.
23. Neither the macroeconomic variables nor FDI lagged could predict changes in Polity 
IV scores over time. In one test, good performance on the current account was inversely 
associated with the FH political rights scale.
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To be sure, there are substantive reasons why risk-mitigating factors 
such as investment climate may not perform consistently. Trevino, Dan-
iels, and Arbeláez (2002, 42) argue that political risk may not be as impor-
tant a factor if MNCs do not see much difference among the performance 
of the Latin American countries on this indicator. Moreover, as the pres-
ent study suggests, consistent macroeconomic performance, especially on 
the current account, may serve as suffi cient commitment by Latin Ameri-
can states to liberal market policies and globalization to allay the appre-
hensions of foreign investors. One erstwhile principle the nonfi nding on 
reform underscores is that no commitment to liberalization is credible 
without a demonstrated obligation to macroeconomic policy discipline 
(Loser and Williams 1997, 268). Once again, this highlights the importance 
of consistent positive performance on the current account. Foreign inves-
tors appear less impressed with what Latin American governments say 
and more persuaded by what they have done and how that has already 
paid off.
The “deeds, not words” injunction has fundamental implications for 
policy and reform in Latin America. The conditions of competitiveness in 
the current global system have placed a premium on MNCs choosing their 
investment locations wisely and with an eye to an international strategy. 
Latin American governments seeking to lure this investment will never 
have access to the same information MNC managers do, so not even their 
best promotional strategies will affect FDI fl ows. These governments would 
be better advised to generate stable macroeconomic results. To be sure, 
good governance and economic reforms are a means to this end, so one 
ought not conclude that governments can get to deeds without haggling 
over the terms of reform. Policies that attract FDI must come in packages. 
Yet MNCs are not likely to act in the face of a rapidly changing global mar-
ketplace without some sense that Latin American governments are closer 
to the deeds end of the policy spectrum than they are to the words end.
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